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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
JOHN THOMAS SNYDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: Case No. 20000591 
AN APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY 
DEPARTMENT, The Hon. Michael K. Burton, Judge Presiding 
(Trial Court Case No/ 00-201-0956) 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JOHN TOM SNYDER by and through counsel, 
submits this REPLY BRIEF in further support of his appeal. 
REPLY RE: ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Salt Lake County Housing Authority (hereinafter "Housing 
Authority") has not filed an appeal. The Housing Authority's 
gratuitous recitation of its "issues presented for review" in Mr. 
Snyder's appeal is not helpful. The opening brief filed by 
appellant, John Thomas Snyder, sets forth the issues presented 
for review and now before this Court. 
1 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Mr. Snyder preserved each issue presented on appeal. The 
various matters presented were disposed of by necessary 
implication by the judgment. Each issue on appeal was presented 
to and considered by the trial court. Even if the issues had not 
been formally preserved for appeal, the issues are of such 
significance that the rulings and actions of the trial court were 
"plain error" such that they may be considered on appeal. 
Mr. Snyder presented "good cause" to continue trial. The 
trial court was erroneously informed the case was ready for 
trial. Mr. Snyder was not prepared for a trial. Mr. Snyder was 
not granted time to engage in discovery and prepare a defense. 
The trial court erred by allowing an expedited hearing. 
Prior to 1981, actions for unlawful detainer were granted 
expedited trial dates by the rules of practice in the Utah trial 
courts. After 1981, the unlawful detainer statutes does not 
provide for an expedited trial absent utilization of the 
possession bond provision. 
Mr. Snyder properly marshaled the evidence with regard to 
the insufficient facts presented at trial. Those facts, in their 
entirety, do not support a "beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal 
conviction for assault. Mr. Snyder made no attempt to do injury. 
Similarly, Mr. Snyder made no threat to do bodily injury. All of 
the facts presented at trial and now marshaled for this Court do 
2 
not establish a threats accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury. 
The validity of the lease provisions was presented to the 
trial court and is properly before this court. The lease 
provision the Housing Authority chose to include is unreasonable. 
Mr. Snyder's lease provision prohibits "all illegal or criminal 
activity on or near the premises'' (R. 7-8) . The provision 
justifies eviction without a due process administrative 
proceeding for minor offenses. The federal regulations do not 
allow such a broad prohibition. The lease provision is too broad 
and thus unreasonable. 
The unlawful detainer statute provides an extremely harsh 
remedy. There must be strict compliance throughout the entire 
eviction process. The notice of eviction served upon Mr. Snyder 
recites alleged criminal behavior against an employee. The 
notice of eviction refers to a lease provision prohibiting mis-
conduct toward a tenant. At no time did Mr. Snyder engaged in 
alleged mis-conduct toward a tenant. The eviction notice is 
therefore defective, and Mr. Snyder's eviction was not justified. 
Mr. Snyder was entitled to an administrative hearing to 
challenge his eviction as per the terms and conditions of his 
lease with the County Housing Authority. This issue was raised 
before the trial court. Even if it were not raised below, it is 
properly before this Court. Failure to allow administrative 
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review is jurisdictional. Jurisdictional defects may be raised 
and considered at any time. 
The Housing Authority may exclude certain matters from the 
administrative grievance procedure based upon a due process 
determination from HUD. The exclusion from the administrative 
grievance procedure is strictly linked to the judicial procedure 
subject to HUD's due process determination. In Utah, HUD's due 
process determination of the judicial eviction procedure does not 
apply where the plaintiff obtains possession by filing a 
possession bond. Utah's forcible detainer statute authorizes an 
expedited hearing only when the plaintiff files a possession bond 
and the defendant requests an expedited hearing. HUD's due 
process determination in Utah, thus, does not apply to any 
expedited eviction procedures. Therefore, in Utah there are no 
exclusions from the administrative grievance procedure in any 
expedited evictions involving federally subsidized housing. Mr. 
Snyder should have been allowed to avail himself of the 
administrative grievance procedure. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PRESERVED EACH ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
The Housing Authority argues that various issues on appeal 
were not preserved in the trial court such that this Court is 
now precluded from reviewing them. Mr. Snyder reaffirms and 
reasserts that, as set forth in his opening brief, each issue on 
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appeal was presented to and properly preserved before the trial 
court. 
The Housing Authority contends that certain motions made by 
Mr. Snyder were never ruled upon by the trial court and that 
notices to submit were never submitted.1 The various matters 
presented and motions made prior to and at the beginning of the 
trial for a continuance, etc. were disposed of by necessary 
implication by the judgment. 
The Housing Authority notes, for instance, that Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 233) was never submitted to the 
trial court for decision. Therefore, the Housing Authority 
argues the issues therein are not properly before this Court on 
appeal. Mr. Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 233) was 
never submitted for ruling because of the expedited trial and its 
final judgment. The briefing allowed under the Code of Judicial 
Administration had not been completed by the time of trial. Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501. 
Mr. Snyder sets forth in his opening brief when and where 
during the proceedings below the various issues raised on appeal 
were presented to and considered by the trial court. Brief of 
1
 Notices to submit (Rule 4-501, Ut. Code of Jud. Admin.) 
were not filed because a trial was held and a judgment was 
entered even before the time has expired for plaintiff to respond 
to the motions and defendant reply. For instance, on May 1, 
2000, Mr. Snyder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 229); 
the trial was held on May 8, 2000. 
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Appellant, p. 2. Each issue on appeal was presented to and 
considered by the trial court.2 
Mr. Snyder filed an Objection to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgement entered (R. 259). The 
issues now on appeal were heard and considered by the trial court 
in ruling on Mr. Snyder's Objection to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and to Judgment. Because the trial court had 
the first opportunity to rule on the issues presented, they have 
been preserved for appeal. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 
(Utah 1991). 
Even if the issues had not been formally preserved for 
appeal before the trial court, the issues are of such 
significance that the rulings and actions of the trial court were 
"plain error" such that they may still be considered in this 
appeal. Under a plain error analysis, an error must have 
occurred, that error should have been apparent to the trial court 
and the error must have caused harm. Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. 
All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 Ut. App. 88, f 17, 978 P.2d 465 
(Ut. App. 1999)(citing Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 956 (Ut. 
App. 1998)). All three (3) elements necessary for a plain error 
review are present in this action. 
2
 While the trial court may not have issued formal written 
orders ruling on every issue raised by defendant, the trial court 
ruled on them. If nothing else, those rulings are implicit in 
the trial court holding a trial and rendering a judgment over the 
clear objections of Mr. Snyder. 
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II. JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PRESENTED "GOOD CAUSE" TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
Snyder's written and oral motions for continuance set forth 
"good cause" for continuing the trial which had been 
improvidently set. Simply put, Snyder was not prepared for a 
trial. Snyder was not granted sufficient time to engage in 
discovery.3 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN EXPEDITED HEARING. 
Prior to 1981 and the enactment of the possession bond 
provision (Ut. Code Ann. §78-36-8.5 (1953 as amended)), actions 
for unlawful detainer were routinely granted expedited trial 
dates by the rules of practice in the Utah trial courts. That 
priority became unnecessary with the enactment of the possession 
bond provisions which set a process by which a landlord could 
quickly secure possession and a tenant could be heard. 
The Housing Authority's citations to general rules allowing 
a trial court to manage its own calendar are not useful. Ut. 
Code Ann. §78-36-8.5 (1953 as amended) governs the exclusive 
process to quickly present the issue of immediate possession to a 
trial court. Absent utilization of the possession bond 
provision, the unlawful detainer statutes does not provide for an 
3
 The Housing Authority's counsel falsely represented 
otherwise to the trial court (R. 29). Similarly the Housing 
Authority's counsel falsely represented to the trial court that 
meaningful settlement discussions had occurred (R. 29-30). No 
such discussions occurred. 
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expedited trial in a case such as this. Similarly, plaintiff's 
citation to cases which pre-date the 1981 enactment of the bond 
statute are not helpful. 
Unquestionably, the memo from the Administrative Office of 
the Court and Brent Johnson (R. 164-166) is not controlling 
authority. However, Mr. Snyder suggests that the official 
position of the Administrative Office of the Court and Brent 
Johnson's interpretation of the statute are entitled to more than 
a little weight as persuasive authority. 
The Housing Authority claims some ability of a landlord "to 
move an unlawful detainer matter forward on an expedited basis'' 
independent of the possession bond provision. Brief of Appellee, 
p. 15. However, the Housing Authority cites no authority for 
that claim. Furthermore, the Housing Authority cites no 
authority for its claim that posting of a possession bond 
"provides for an even more expedited basis for having a tenant 
removed." Brief of Appellee, p. 15. The Housing Authority cites 
no authority for the claim that the pre-1981, pre-possession bond 
expedited consideration of unlawful detainer actions continued 
after the enactment of the possession bond provision. The Memo 
from the Administrative Office of the Courts clearly weighs 
against the Housing Authority's self serving interpretation. 
That treble damages may accrue against a tenant found to be 
in unlawful detainer is of no moment when discussing and 
8 
attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; [or] a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another." Ut. Code Ann. § 
76-5-102 (1953 as amended)). Mr. Snyder made no attempt to do 
injury. Similarly, Mr. Snyder made no threat to do bodily 
injury. All of the facts presented at trial and now marshaled 
for this Court do not establish a threat, accompanied by a show 
of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury. The mutual 
unpleasantness that occurred, even punctuated with yelling and 
foul language4, is not an assault. 
V. THE VALIDITY OF THE LEASE PROVISIONS WAS PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The validity of the lease provisions was presented to the 
trial court and is properly before this Court on appeal. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 5 2 (R. 25); Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, passim (R. 233-248); and, at trial 
(Transcript, pp. 94:23 - 95:1-9; 103:25 - 104:2). 
The Housing Authority argues that it must be able to 
"include additional terms and conditions in their leases which 
4
 The trial court orally found "[Snyder] started pointing 
his finger and coming around the desk . . . He was loud, he was 
upset, he was angry, his choice of words was intimidating." 
Transcript at 101:2-17. The trial court did not find that Mr. 
Snyder made a specific threat of physical harm instead the court 
felt that Mr. Snyder's getting close to Ms. Rico, his tone of 
voice and language were intimidating and threatening. Id. at 
103:11-24. 
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considering a landlord's right to seek immediate possession with 
a surety bond. The risk is for the tenant to assume if he/she 
wishes to challenge eviction. That such onerous punitive damages 
may accrue might justify and warrant a tenant seeking expedited 
consideration. However, that fact does not account for the trial 
court's granting an expedited trial at the insistence of the 
landlord absent a possession bond as occurred herein. 
IV. JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE WITH 
REGARD TO THE INSUFFICIENT FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
As required by this Court, Snyder has marshaled the evidence 
with regard to the insufficient facts presented at trial to 
support his "criminal conviction" for assault. Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 19-21. In addition, the Housing Authority has 
recited in its brief the portions of the record that allegedly 
support that "guilty verdict." Brief of Appellee, n 6-8, pp. 8-
9. All of those facts, in their entirety, do not support a 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal conviction for assault. 
The trial court erroneously and improperly found criminal 
conduct on the part of Snyder. The evidence presented at trial 
did not support a finding by a preponderance of evidence much 
less beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal conduct by Snyder. 
The evidence is insufficient to support a finding of 
criminal conduct after marshaling all facts to support the trial 
court's finding. The crime allegedly committed was assault ("an 
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are reasonable." Brief of Appellee, p. 23-24. However, the 
provision the Housing Authority chose to include is unreasonable. 
Mr. Snyder's lease provision prohibits "all illegal or criminal 
activity on or near the premises" (emphasis added) (R. 7-8) . A 
literal reading would justify the eviction of a tenant without a 
due process administrative grievance proceeding for minor 
offenses. Transcript, p. 103:20-24. 
The interpretive federal regulations do not allow such a 
broad prohibition with regard to criminal activity or its 
location. The intent of the lease and relevant regulations is 
not to allow eviction for minor infractions; rather, the intent 
is that only certain criminal activity may be prohibited. The 
lease provision is too broad and thus unreasonable. It is 
contrary to HUD's requirements as set out in 24 CFR § 
966.4(f)(12)(i). As a result, the provision is void and invalid. 
The provision, therefore, should be read as follows: 
I. Resident and household members, guests and 
visitors will act in a manner so as not to disturb any 
neighbors peaceful enjoyment of his/her accommodations 
and refrain from all illegal or Criminal activity on or 
near—the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but 
is not limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the 
Resident, household members, guests or visitors. 
Exhibit "B" attached to Complaint (R. 13) ("strike through" added 
for emphasis). 
Neither the lease nor the eviction notice provide for 
termination of the lease based upon "criminal activity that 
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threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of 
the PHA's public housing premises by . . . employees of the PHA." 
24 CFR § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(A) (emphasis added)(a copy of the 
relevant federal regulations is attached to Brief of Appellant as 
Attachment "D"). 
The Housing Authority does not explain the omission of said 
provision in its lease with Mr. Snyder and eviction notice served 
upon him. As outlined in the Brief of Appellant, a comparison of 
24 CFR § 966.4(f) (Tenant's obligations) and 24 CFR § 
966.4(1)(Termination of tenancy and eviction) is demonstrative. 
The former provides that a tenant shall not engage in: 
(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the 
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
PHA's public housing premises by other residents or 
employees of the PHA, or 
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near 
such premises. 
24 CFR § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(emphasis added). 
In contrast, 24 CFR § 966.4(1)(Termination of tenancy and 
eviction) allows termination of tenancy only for 
(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the 
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
PHA's public housing premises by other residents. 
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near 
such premises. 
24 CFR § 966.4(1)(2)(ii). Absent in the second CFR provision is 
termination for threatening employees of the PHA. Mr. Snyder's 
lease incorporated the second provision. Based upon the 
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allegations of the complaint and the eviction notice, even if 
defendant had engaged in criminal conduct it was not directed 
toward other tenants. 
Finally, the unlawful detainer statute provides an extremely 
harsh remedy. As a result, there must be strict compliance 
throughout the entire eviction process. See generally Sovereen 
v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979); Cache County v. Beus, 978 
P.2d 1043 (Ut. App. 1999). Herein, the notice of eviction 
recites alleged criminal behavior against an employee. However, 
the notice of eviction refers to a lease provision prohibiting 
mis-conduct toward a tenant. At no time did Mr. Snyder engaged 
in alleged mis-conduct toward a tenant. "Strict compliance" 
invalidates the eviction notice itself (the notice of eviction 
describes mis-conduct against Ms. Rico, the apartment manager (an 
employee), yet the lease provision cited does not prohibit mis-
conduct toward an employee). Therefore, the eviction notice was 
defective, and Mr. Snyder's eviction was not justified on the 
grounds asserted by the County Housing Authority. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION BECAUSE JOHN THOMAS 
SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING. FAILURE 
TO ALLOW ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW IS JURISDICTIONAL. 
Mr. Snyder was entitled to an administrative hearing to 
challenge his eviction as per the terms and conditions of his 
lease with the County Housing Authority. This issue was raised 
before the trial court. However, even if it were not raised 
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there, it is properly before this Court. Jurisdictional defects 
may be raised and considered at any time. State ex rel. R.N.J., 
908 P.2d 345, 350 (Ut. App. 1995) (jurisdictional issues may be 
raised for the first time on appeal); Horn v. Utah Dept of Public 
Safety, 962 P.2d 95, (Ut. App. 1998) (appellate court lacked 
jurisdiction if appellant failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies even if issue not raised at trial). 
The Housing Authority's failure to afford Mr. Snyder a 
review through the administrative grievance process, deprived the 
trial court of jurisdiction to hear this matter. The Housing 
Authority contends that once it alleges that a tenant has engaged 
in prohibited criminal conduct5, the issue is closed and the 
tenant is not allowed access to the administrative grievance 
process. Someone other than the County Housing Authority must 
determine that criminal conduct has occurred thereby precluding 
access to the grievance process. Furthermore, such a 
determination must be made before access to the grievance process 
is denied and a suit is filed. 
In its Appellate Brief, back pedaling, the Housing Authority 
now argues that the "trial court, not the Housing Authority, made 
5
 The Housing Authority asserts, "Snyder's assault on Ms. 
Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority, certainly constitutes 
'good cause' for eviction.'' Brief of Appellee, p. 28. Under the 
lease, for a "good cause" eviction, Mr. Snyder would be allowed 
to avail himself of the grievance process and an administrative 
hearing! 
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the determination that Snyder engaged in the requisite criminal 
activity." Brief of Appellee, p. 29. The defect in this 
argument is that absent the Housing Authority's initial 
determination that the tenant is not entitled to an 
administrative grievance process, no lawsuit would have been 
filed and the trial court would not have had the opportunity to 
made the determination of criminal conduct. 
The Housing Authority asserts that Mr. Snyder was not 
entitled to a grievance hearing. They cite 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 in 
support of its assertion. That provision is contingent on a due 
process determination from HUD; one such determination was issued 
to November 8, 1991 regarding Utah's eviction statutes (a copy is 
attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment(see Appellee's Addendum)). 
The Code of Federal Regulations provides 
If HUD has issued a due process determination, a 
PHA [Public Housing Authority] may exclude from the PHA 
administrative grievance procedure . . . any grievance 
concerning a termination of tenancy or eviction that 
involves: 
(A) any criminal activity that threatens the 
health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises of other residents 
or employees of the PHA, or 
(B) any drug related criminal activity on or near 
such premises. 
(iv) If HUD has issued the due process determination, 
the PHA may evict the occupants . . . through the 
judicial eviction procedures which are the subject 
of the determination. In this case, the PHA is 
15 
not required to provide an opportunity for a 
hearing under the PHA's administrative grievance 
procedure. 
24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (1999) (emphasis added). 
The exclusion from the administrative grievance procedure 
is, therefore, strictly linked to the judicial procedure that is 
the subject of the due process determination. In Utah, HUD's due 
process determination of the judicial eviction procedure "does 
not apply where plaintiff obtains possession by filing a 
possession bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8." HUD Utah 
Due Process Determination, November 8, 1991, p. 2, n.l (attached 
to Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment(see Appellee's Addendum)). Under Utah law, the 
Forcible Detainer statute authorizes an expedited hearing only 
when the plaintiff files a possession bond and the defendant 
requests an expedited hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 
(1953 as amended). By implication, HUD's due process 
determination does not apply to any expedited eviction 
procedures. As a result, Mr. Snyder should have been able to 
avail himself of the administrative grievance procedure prior to 
eviction. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wherefore, this Court should determine that 1) the trial 
court erred in granting County Housing Authority an expedited 
16 
trial absent the posting of a possession bond; 2) Mr. Snyder did 
not engage in criminal activity in violation of the lease 
agreement and was not in unlawful detainer of the premises; 3) 
County Housing Authority was not justified in terminating Mr. 
Snyder's Lease, 4) the Judgment against Mr. Snyder is invalid; 
and, 5) that Mr. Snyder's lease be reinstated. 
In the alternative, this Court should determine that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction and that Mr. Snyder is entitled 
to avail himself of the administrative grievance procedure prior 
to termination of his lease. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of MARCH 2001 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
by J CV|^7 [^ 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
JAMES 1. HARRIS, Jr. 
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